

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ACDA-12 CIAE-00 INR-07 IO-13 L-03
NSAE-00 NSC-05 EB-08 NRC-05 OES-07 SOE-02 DODE-00
SS-15 SP-02 /092 W
-----060727 271929Z /66

R 271806Z JAN 78

FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4534
INFO DOE WASHDC
DOE GERMANTOWN
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY VIENNA

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USEEC

DEPT PASS OES/NET AND IO/SCT. VIENNA FOR USIAEA

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, TECH, IAEA, EEC
SUBJECT: EURATOM-IAEA SAFEGUARDS ON LWR'S AND SENSITIVE
- FACILITIES

REF: (A) VIENNA 712, (B) VIENNA 521

1. COMMISSIONER BRUNNER TELLS ME THAT AFTER WILLIAMS' TALK
IN VIENNA WITH IEA DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL HALL AND OTHERS
COMMISSION HAS DECIDED TO APPROACH COREPER FEBRUARY 2 TO
SEEK "FOR LAST TIME" ADDITIONAL FLEXIBILITY. BRUNNER
DESCRIBED THE ADDED FLEXIBILITY AS SEEKING COREPER AGREEMENT
TO ACCEPT ONE ADDITIONAL JOINT IAEA/EURATOM LWR
INSPECTION PER YEAR (WHICH SEEMS TO US TO BE THE SAME THING
AS ACCEPTING THAT "RANDOM" MEANS 50 PERCENT). BRUNNER
EXPRESSED STRONG PERSONAL ANNOYANCE THAT U.S. HAD CHOSEN
TO NEGOTIATE FIRST WITH SOVIETS AND THEN TO PUT ADDITIONAL
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PRESSURE ON COMMUNITY. HE SAID HE PLANNED TO TELL AMBASSADOR SMITH WHEN HE WAS HERE THAT SUCH TACTICS WERE CONTRIBUTING TO GENERAL COMMUNITY DISTRUST OF U.S. NUCLEAR POLICY
AND HE WANTED ME TO KNOW THAT U.S. FAILURE TO SUPPORT PROMISE COMMUNITY HAD PREVIOUSLY AGREED TO WAS MAJOR FACTOR
COMPLICATING COMMISSION EFFORTS TO OBTAIN COMMUNITY AGREEMENT TO RENEGOTIATE U.S.-EURATOM COOPERATION AGREEMENT.

WHAT WE HAD DONE STRENGTHENED FRENCH HAND AND TRIED PATIENCE OF OUR BEST FRIENDS IN COMMUNITY. WILLIAMS WOULD HAVE HARD JOB IN COREPER IN SELLING THIS LATEST EROSION IN EUROPEAN POSITION. HE WOULD PREEMPT MEMBER STATE COMPLAINTS ABOUT U.S. BEHAVIOR BY FORCEFULLY CRITICIZING U.S. ACTIONS AND GIVING CATEGORIC COMMITMENT TO COREPER THAT IF THEY ACCEPTED THIS ONE, IT WOULD BE THE "LAST STEP" IN EFFORTS TO REACH COMPROMISE WITH IAEA. (COMMENT: IN FACT, THIS PROBABLY NOT THE "LAST STEP," BUT THAT IS WHAT WAS SAID AND IT IS TRUE THAT COMMUNITY PATIENCE IS RUNNING OUT.)

2. REGARDING SENSITIVE FACILITIES WILLIAMS AND HALL, ACCORDING TO BRUNNER, AGREED TO DEVELOP NEW METHOD TO MEET SEVEN TO TWENTY-ONE DAY DETECTION TIME REQUIREMENT. EXPERTS ARE SAID TO BE WORKING ON HOW THIS CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED, CONSIDERING SUCH TECHNICAL QUESTIONS AS ACCESS POINTS, ETC.

3. IN SEPARATE CONVERSATION, WILLIAMS ALSO APPEARED TO BE UPSET, FOR SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT REASONS. HE SAID HE FELT THAT ROMETSCH WAS NOT EFFECTIVELY COMMUNICATING TO HIS SUBORDINATES (E.G., ON THE CONTACT TEAM) THE AGREEMENTS IN PRINCIPLE THAT ARE REACHED WITH WILLIAMS. HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT ROMETSCH WAS GIVING THIS MATTER THE CLOSE ATTENTION IT REQUIRES. IN THIS CONNECTION, WILLIAMS

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SAID THAT THE CAUSE OF THIS ATTITUDE MAY BE THAT ROMETSCH, HE SAID, IS DEFINITELY LEAVING, WITH A SUCCESSOR TO BE AGENDA ITEM FOR THE FEBRUARY GB MEETING.

4. ON LWR'S, AND THE ACCEPTABILITY TO HIM OF THE IAEA COUNTER-PROPOSAL (RANDOM EQUALS 50 PERCENT), WILLIAMS SAID HE WAS NOT AT ALL PLEASED WITH THIS HAGGLING OVER DETAILS AND, EXCEPT FOR THE OVERALL IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUE, AND THE NEAR-COMPLETION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, WOULD HAVE BLUNTLY REJECTED THE COUNTER-PROPOSAL (HIS PATIENCE, TOO, IS RUNNING OUT.) REGARDING SENSITIVE FACILITIES, HE TOLD US THAT HE EXPRESSED CONCERN TO FISCHER AND ROMETSCH WHETHER IT WAS RIGHT TO MOVE SO FAST ON THE SAGSI RECOMMENDATION (I.E., AT THE FEBRUARY GB MEETING). HE SAID THAT HE PLANNED TO SUGGEST TO EC MEMBER COUNTRIES THAT THEY GO ALONG WITH THE GENERAL CONCEPT OF DETECTION TIMES BUT THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE BROUGHT INTO FORCE UNTIL ABOUT JUNE 1978, ALLOWING TIME TO STUDY THE PRACTICAL IMPACT ON EXISTING FACILITIES. (COMMENT: THIS SOUNDS TO US LIKE A HINT THAT THE EC MAY BE SEEKING MORE THAN 90 DAYS FOR THE NEXT EXTENSION. WILLIAMS NOTED THAT THE VERIFICATION AGREEMENT DOES NOT SPECIFY THE LENGTH OF EXTENSIONS).

5. WILLIAMS AND FISCHER AGREED PRIOR TO THE MEETING THAT IT WOULD BE BEST NOT TO BRING UP THE "AD HOC-ERY" OPTION (REF B).

6. WILLIAMS SAID THAT ONE POSITIVE RESULT, FROM HIS POINT OF VIEW, OF HIS MEETING IN VIENNA WAS THE "UNEQUIVOCAL AGREEMENT" BY FISCHER THAT, FOR THE LWR SITUATION, THE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 BRUSSELS 01697

QUARTERLY AND SEMIANNUAL INSPECTIONS ARE CONSIDERED TO BE TEMPORARY AND THAT AFTER SUITABLY RELIABLE EQUIPMENT IS AVAILABLE IAEA INSPECTIONS WOULD GO BACK TO ANNUAL.

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